Hi, I'm Severin de Wit, host of the TrustTalk podcast, where we dive deep into the fascinating world of trust. With a genuine passion for understanding the foundations and nuances of trust, I am dedicated to uncovering its secrets and sharing compelling stories that illuminate its profound impact. Join me on this captivating journey as we explore the transformative power of trust. Subscribe now and become part of the TrustTalk community
Hi, I'm Severin de Wit, host of the TrustTalk podcast, where we dive deep into the fascinating world of trust. With a genuine passion for understanding the foundations and nuances of trust, I am dedicated to uncovering its secrets and sharing compelling stories that illuminate its profound impact. Join me on this captivating journey as we explore the transformative power of trust. Subscribe now and become part of the TrustTalk community
Lawrence Freedman begins his Strategy: A History with a discussion of chimpanzees, noting how research shows them to be political and strategic, using cooperation and coalition-building, deception, rewards, and occasional instrumental violence in managing and limiting their conflicts. It was evident that competition had to be limited because there would be moments where the same chimpanzees would need to join forces for the greater good of the group. The chimps had to kiss and make up after fights and, as Freedman observes, by ‘showing their vulnerability they invited trust’. Trust, or its absence, is a key feature of political and social relations.
Trust is a central concept in domestic politics and international relations literature. In the latter, it almost invariably applies to judgments about other actors: will they prove faithful allies, will they adhere to their treaty and other commitments, do they have benign intentions? These questions are critical, but surprisingly little work has been done on how policymakers reach these decisions and how they ought to. I further contend that trust has a wider application to international relations. It describes the belief policymakers have in their own judgment, the efficacy of their initiatives, and their ability to control or influence others to bring these initiatives to fruition. These beliefs are often misplaced and there is a large literature on this subject, much of it drawing on the work of cognitive and motivational psychology.”
So if we look at how the most serious conflicts that are resolved peacefully get resolved, it’s in part through candor. So let me just give you three historical examples. Britain and France, which almost went to war in 1898, ultimately through diplomacy, became good friends and allies. Egypt and Israel resolved their differences. So war receded, although they certainly don’t have what one would call friendly relations. And the Kissinger Mao Tse-Tung, Chou En-lai, Nixon negotiations led to a very serious improvement in Sino-American relations. In each of these conflicts, it was necessary for both sides to convince the other that they wanted accommodation and to live in peace, and to act in ways that not only express their candor but put their cards on the table and demonstrate it. And those gestures, which ultimately became reciprocal, pave the way for these accommodations. So candor is a very important part of international relations, and it’s only a certain brand of a crazy realist who thinks that all ethics stops at the water’s edge and has no role to play in international relations. In a book I published in 2020 with Cambridge University Press called “Ethics and International Relations, A Tragic View“, I made the case that ethical behavior is appropriate to international relations, not on any moral basis, but rather because I could demonstrate empirically that if states behaved in accord with what we’re seeing as the conventional ethics of the day, their policies were more likely to succeed. And when they violated those norms, their policies were less successful. So as a purely practical matter, I think I can demonstrate historically how relevant ethics and candor are to international relations. Now, this doesn’t mean that every moment of the day that one should be completely candid. We don’t do this in our personal relationships, either. You know, occasionally we tell in English what a call, I mean if one can still use the term these days, “white lies”, you know, little lies, which we do so often to avoid embarrassing ourselves or other people. That’s a very different kind of proposition.
The podcast interview
Listen to the full podcast interview:
Full transcript of the interview
Here is the full transcript of the interview with Ned Lebow
Trust in negotiations cannot be easily understated. In this interview negotiation experts, Bob Bordone and Tim Masselink explain what it takes to build trust during negotiations. Negotiation includes any intent, any effort, any set of communications to influence or to persuade. So embedded under negotiation are things like dispute resolution or conflict resolution or mediation in my mind, because all of those tasks in some way are around trying to influence behavior. Negotiation is bigger than that. Negotiation includes both making deals and helping people resolve conflicts or helping people manage disputes in some way. What do skillful negotiators have to make them succeed? The importance to create value with the other side: the more negotiators feel that there is trust with their counterpart, the less risky it is for any of the parties to share information about their preferences, the less risky it is for them to engage in a joint venture with them. The role of online or real-life meetings for the outcome of negotiations, the importance of being honest and predictable.
Bob Bordone on Risk and Trust
I think there’s a big connection between the two, of course, part of what you’re trying to do in a negotiation, right, is I think to reduce the risk of exploitation to yourself or whoever it is you’re representing, at the same time, of course, by dint of the negotiation, right, you are also trying to create some value with the other side. So one of the ways of reducing risk, right, is the more I feel that there is trust with my counterpart, the less risky it is for me to share information about my preferences, the less risky it is for me to engage in a joint venture with them. And, you know, one of the things I always say is when I’m teaching negotiation is that there are a lot of things in the world that we humans can’t control. And certainly, the last year has really shown us that, because if you would have said two years ago on your list of worries is a global pandemic, where does the global pandemic rank? I would have said it’s not on the list, right, so we know that humans, we can’t control so much. But one thing we have some ability to control when things and the world go bad, whether it’s a pandemic or a recession or a war or a weather event, is how the person on the other side of the negotiation table will act when these unpredictable things happen. And the more trust, the more we have a good relationship, the more we’ve worked cooperatively, the more I know that when something really bad happens, they’re not going to act, exploit me, but we’re going to instead act to try to be supportive and helpful of each other
Tim Masselink on trust and transparency:
you raised the point about transparency because it seems to be like something that is the highest objective almost at the moment. We like radical transparency and for negotiations, it just doesn’t work like that because people represent people. So you have to if it’s recorded, if it’s on camera, what will happen is that the negotiators, they will actually turn more towards their base, towards to constituents, then towards each other, because they have to look strong and ready for battle, so to say. And one thing that also comes to mind is in this age with a lot of virtual negotiations, which I know Bob also does a lot of work with, we recently had some EU negotiations with all the EU country leaders via virtual negotiations. And interestingly enough, they were basically completely useless, the negotiations, because people were not willing to compromise or to come together at all. And one of the reasons for that has to do with trust because it’s a bit cynical, maybe, but through ZOOM, or to any other program, you don’t know who else is in the room, for example. So you don’t know if we are in this call with the three of us, or maybe there is there are five other people standing outside of the reach of the camera